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APPELLANTS' DISPUTATION OF APPELLEE-ASSERTED "FACTS" 
Appellants dispute the Appellee-asserted [pp. 4 through 
I 
11 of BRIEF OF APPELLEES] 11 statement of facts 11 • There was no 
trial, and there were---consequently---no formalized 
"findings" per se. Appellees' recitation of the numerous 
claimed II facts 11 - - -including ostensible page citations to the 
"Record" of the case---are simply misleading: Appellees' 
recitation of those 11 facts 11 , particularly those pertaining 
to events occurring prior to the filing of this lawsuit, is 
7 
no better or no more accurate that Appellants' recitations. 
We are dealing here with the grant of "summary 
judgment"---wherein even "sworn evidence" is presented NOT 
for establishing the facts, but rather for the narrow issue 
of establishing whether the material facts are "in genuine 
dispute", so as to render summary judgment unavailable: 
3 
except for a very narrow set of facts, most if not all of 
the 1995 and forward "history" of things is essentially 
irrelevant, except insofar as Plaintiffs' have thus been 
denied their opportunity to establish the facts in support 
of their claims. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANTS PROPERLY "PRESERVED" FOR "APPEAL" 
THE SPECIFIC ISSUES BY EXPRESSLY PRESENTING 
THOSE ARGUMENTS TO THE DISTRICT COURT 
A. Court's misapprehension of "contract 11 -based claims and 
Section 78B-2-104 ["Effect of absence from state"] 
Defendants-Appellees assert [p. 17 of BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES] that Plaintiffs failed to "preserve" for "appeal" 
the issues designated in Points I ["mischaracterization of 
contr~ct-based claims"] and II [effect of Defendant BROWN'S 
absence from the state] of APPELLANTS' BRIEF. Defendants-
Appellees are absolutely mistaken in those "no preservatfon" 
assertions. 
That Plaintiffs properly raised those issues before the 
District Court is documented and confirmed by the District 
Court's "ruling" identifying and disposing of those claims, 
thus: 
First, Plaintiffs assert that "the Court 
misapprehended (and thus · overlooked II the true 
'contractually-based' nature of Plaintiffs' claim 
(against SENTRY) and instead converted Plaintiffs' 
claims to allege 'fraud,' for which a shorter 
statute : of limitation would apply. 11 (Pls.' R. 
59(b) and R.60(b) Mot. 2). This claim is 
inconsistent with the Court's December 16, 2013, 
ruling, in which the Court specifically found that 
the contractual claims, i.e., Plaintiffs' first 
and second causes of action, were barred by the 
4 
' 
( 
( 
) 
) 
) 
) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
six (6) year statute of limitations as Plaintiffs 
themselves asserted, they breached the terms of 
the April 1994 Letter Agreement in mid-1995 but 
did not file any suit until June 2007. See supra 
at 4. See also fn. 4. 
Plaintiffs also assert that the Court failed 
to consider Utah Code Annotated Section 78B-2-104 
in its consideration of Plaintiffs' fraud claim 
against Mr. Brown. Although Plaintiffs 
specifically cite Section 78B-2-104 in its Motion, 
following Defendants' Opposition, Plaintiffs, in 
their Reply, assert that the pre-2008 amended 
version, Section 78-12-35 is applicable. The Court 
finds that under either version Plaintiffs' claim 
that Mr. Brown's out-of-state resident status 
tolls the statute of limitations fails. 
RULING, dated 24 June 2014, pages 3-4, RECORD at 946-956, 
specifically at 950-951. Emphasis added. 
The District Court's own RULING is quite literally the 
absolute "best evidence" the arguments were presented to the 
District Court. Contrary to Defendants-Appellees' incorrect 
claims, it is quite obvious the two issues were presented to 
the District Court, which expressly ruled thereon. The 
issues are thus "preserved" for 11 appeal".FOOTNOTE1 
"Winding up" of corporate affairs for MAJESTIC. 
Defendants-Appellees assert [p. 17 of BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES] that Point IV ["winding up" of corporate affairs] 
was not presented to the District Court. Although not 
expressly ruled upon in its June 2014 RULING, the issue was 
1 In making the "no preservation" assertions, it seems 
to the undersigned that the Appellees are attempting to take 
advantage of an unexplained "computer glitch" - - -arising 
within the E-filing of the documents---by which some of the 
E-filed materials are not presently contained within the 
Court's "paper file", its elf recently download specifically 
for the appeal. The Defendants---who did receive the E-filed 
documents, as confirmed by their filed "responses" thereto- -
-were not prejudiced in any way by the "technical glitch". 
5 
nevertheless presented to the District Court within 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS, filed 24 November 2012, RECORD at 406-441, more 
specifically pp. 14-17 thereof, RECORD at 419-422. See also 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS, dated 21 November 2012, filed 24 November 2012, 
Paragraph 2, RECORD at 443-449, and most specifically RECORD 
at 444. 
Obviously, the "winding up" issue was presented to the 
District Court and the issue has been properly "preserved" 
for "appeal". Again Appellees' assertions prove incorrect 
and unsubstantiated. 
II 
THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
IN BARRING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
Def endants-Appellee·s identify [p. 1 of BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES] - - -even correctly- - -the two fundamental issues for 
this appeal, paraphrased thus: 
1. Did trial court properly grant summary 
judgment for Defendants? 
2. Did trial court correctly determine and apply 
the statute of limitations? 
The Defendants-Appellees openly admit and acknowledge 
the "core" basis of Plaintiffs' pleaded claim---namely, the 
non-disclosure of the quarter-million dollar "paydown 
payment"---thus: 
. Brown made the partial guaranty payment as 
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required by his guaranty contract, and neither 
Brown nor Sentry notified Gillett/Majestic of 
Brown's partial guaranty payment, as Sentry's 
demand for Brown's partial guaranty payment was 
pursuant to a separate agreement between Sentry 
and Brown, to which Gillett was not a party. R. 
390-392; 304-306. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES, pp~ 3-4. Emphasis added. That BROWN 
signed a "separate agreement" is immaterial; each of the co-
guarantors (BROWN, Plaintiff GILLETT, and MAJESTIC HOLDINGS 
signed "individual" guaranty agreements, but all were for 
the common purpose. MAJESTIC paid BROWN $20,000 for his 
"guaranty" of its loan repayment; the Appellees' "separate 
agreement" is a mischaracterization of the parties' 
comprehensive relationship and interlocking obligations .. 
Appel lees' statement distorts SENTRY' s 17 March 1995 "demand 
letter 11 ( to BROWN) , depicted in APPELLANTS' BRIEF, page 3 5, 
and discussed at length in pages 34 through 41 thereafter. 
In theory, on the narrow "statute of limitation" issue-
--arguably, the only issue before the District Court upon 
which a dispositive ruling could be made---some facts were 
"in genuine dispute". 
A. Defendant BROWN'S continuous absence from the State 
Defendants-Appellants have stated [p. 13 of the BRIEF 
OF APPELLEES] that: 
First, Gillett noted that both Defendants and 
Plaintiffs recognized Boyd Brown's residence out 
of state. R. 946. This fact is clearly not in 
dispute and was not in dispute when the trial 
court determined correctly that 11 [j]urisdiction, 
both subject matter and personal, are appropriate 
before this court." Ruling ~ 2 citing Complaint at 
~ 7. 
Emphasis added. If "this fact"---namely BROWN' s out-of-state 
7 
residence---is not in dispute, then the provisions of 78B-2-
104 [effect of absence from state] come into play and 
Plaintiffs' claims against BROWN for "fraud" and for "breach 
of contract" are not barred. 
For Defendant BROWN, Defendants did not rebut 
Plaintiffs' assertion---see AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, Paragraph 3, 
RECORD at 614---which affirmatively alleges Defendant BROWN 
was since the mid-1990s a permanent resident of Wyoming, 
thus: 
3. In the mid-1990s, Mr BROWN relocated his 
permanent residence (from Holladay, Utah: Abinadi 
Drive) to Teton County, Wyosming, where he has 
continuously maintained his permanent legal 
residence and domicile. [In this litigation, the 
initial summons and complaint were served upon him 
at that Wyoming domicile.] 
Emphasis added. 
In September 2011, when Plaintiffs "noticed up" the 
deposition-taking for Defendant BROWN in Salt Lake City, 
Defendants "objected" thereto and sought "protective order" 
relief: to have counsel travel to Wyoming to take the 
deposition. See RECORD at 148-151. [The trial court denied 
the requested "protective order''.] When BROWN'S order was 
finally "taken" in the spring of 2012, the BROWN deposition-
--originally intended to be taken simultaneously with the 
other deponents (Plaintiff GILLETT and SENTRY corporate 
president Mr Ruga)---was postponed to await BROWN'S return 
from his regular months-long winter vacation to Mexico, 
precisely as described in the GILLETT AFFIDAVIT. 
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BROWN'S well-established continuous residence outside 
of the State of Utah, under the provisions of Section 78B-2-
104, Utah Code [Effect of absence from state], the statute 
is tolled for the Plaintiffs' claims ("fraud" AND "breach of 
contract") . 
This result---the "statute" (of limitations) has not 
"run" against the out-of-state resident---is precisely what 
the statute says. This result is the unavoidable situation, 
regardless of Defendants' claims [page 9 of BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES] that BROWN had an "agent" in Utah for service of 
process. BROWN'S claimed---orally asserted, but never 
documented by sworn testimony or contemporaneously-
applicable documentation- - - "agent" was not a "registered 
agent" as would be designated by a corporation, resident or 
non-resident, to receive service of process; BROWN' s claimed 
"agent" was his legal counsel involved in other litigation. 
[It is anybody's guess as to the result if this "agent" were 
unexpectedly "served" with process from another case.] 
"Agent" in the state or not, the statute says what it says. 
The statute [Section 78B-2-104] is quite clear as to 
its meaning and result. The Plaintiffs' claims against BROWN 
are not time-barred. 
That "forum selection" provisions within the 1994 "loan 
documents" designated that suit could be biought within the 
Third District Court in Salt Lake County is an entirely 
different matter and is irrelevant to the statute [78B-2-
104], which is intended to address acquiring "personal 
9 
jurisdiction" over the named defendant, who is generally 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Utah state courts. The "forum 
selection" provisions do not override the unavoidable effect 
of Section 78B-2-104. 
Claims against SENTRY FINANCIAL. 
As noted extensively in APPELLANTS' BRIEF, Defendants--
-particularly SENTRY FINANCIAL---were candid in their 
assertions that the "Brown 'paydown' payment" was NOT 
disclosed to Plaintiffs, until March 2002: Defendants 
claimed there was no need to disclose the "paydown payment", 
as " [borrower: MAJESTIC or "Dave" (Gillett) J still owed the 
money". See APPELLANTS' BRIEF, pp. 25-27 for a more 
extensive discussion of the SENTRY-acknowledged "non-
disclosure" . 
The trial court originally stated that the "fraudulent 
concealment" doctrine as described by Russell Packard 
Development, Inc. vs Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741 (Utah 
Supreme Court 2005) [hereinafter "Russell Packard 
Development" or simply "Russell Packard"] would have 
extended the commencement of the running of the statute of 
limitation until March 2002, when the deposition disclosure 
was made.FOOTNOTE 2 
The Plaintiffs' claims against SENTRY FINANCIAL are 
strictly "breach of contract", based upon the contractual 
2Although Defendants openly acknowledged the "non-
disclosure" of the "paydown payment", the relative 
reasonableness of Plaintiffs' actions may be deemed to 
create the "factual dispute" which precludes summary 
judgment. 
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obligations created by and described in the parties' 1994 
"loan documents", as well as the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. The District Court erred in 
"converting" those pleaded "breach of contract" claims---
when there was a complete absence of any "hard" evidence, or 
even "sworn evidence" (for summary judgment purposes) before 
the Court on the narrow issue---into "fraud" claims, for 
which the significantly "shorter" (6 years "down to" 3 
years) statute of limitation would apply. 
The trial court's selection and application of the 3-
year statute (for "fraud") claims so as to bar the 
Plaintiffs' "breach of contract" claims---against BROWN and 
also against SENTRY FINANCIAL---is error. To have done so 
after the case had been tried and the evidence was "in II and 
before the Court may have been proper; to do so at the 
"summary judgment" when there was a lack of evidence is 
reversible error. 
Defendant SENTRY FINANCIAL's assertions [pp. 20-23 of 
APPELLEES' BRIEF] that Russell Packard stands for and 
supports application of the 3-year statute of limitation for 
fraud is misplaced and erroneous: 
First, the discussion---cited and quoted [pp. 
20-23] by Appellees---within Russell Packard of 
the so-called "statutory discovery rule" was 
specifically appropriate for "fraud", for which 
there is a 3-year "statute'', but for which there 
is an express statutory "discovery rule" 
11 
identified within the statute itself. 
Second, the discussions within Russell Packard 
on the "fraud" example so chosen to illustrate the 
"statutory discovery rule" are so limited, to that 
so-identified "example". In the instant situation, 
Plaintiffs' claims against BROWN and against 
SENTRY are "breach of contract" claims, pursuant 
to relationships and obligations established in 
written documents and for which a 6-year "statute" 
[in accordance with Section 78B-2-209, Utah Code, 
for which there is NO expressed "statutory 
discovery rule" provision within that statute. 
Lastly, the Plaintiffs' claims are for "breach 
of contract" and are not susceptible of 
"conversion" (undersigned's characterization) as 
the District Court has improperly done to "fraud", 
so as to invoke the 3-year "statute". 
Defendants' collective---and even collusive---
intentional and malicious failure to disclose the March 1995 
BROWN "paydown payment" must be action. Defendants' "hiding" 
the payment---while simultaneously taking inconsistent 
actions in conflict therewith---were not disclosed to 
Plaintiffs until March 2002. Under the "fraudulent 
concealment" doctrine identified in Russell Packard 
Development, the 6-year statute of limitation was tolled 
until 2002; Plaintiffs' court filings---the last of which 
was successfully preserved by the "saving statute''---were 
12 
( 
( 
C 
C 
C 
0 
0 
0 
0 
() 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(J 
thus timely and should not be barred. 
III 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULINGS, 
UNRELATED TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION ISSUES 
FOR WHICH SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ACTUALLY GRANTED, 
SHOULD BE SUMMARILY REVERSED, 
IF ONLY TO AVOID UNDESERVED 
"LAW OF THE CASE" ISSUES ON REMAND 
A. Winding up of MAJESTIC AIRLINES corporate affairs. 
The District Court's ruling---to the effect MAJESTIC 
AIRLINES' claims against the Defendants were not valid 
pursuant to any "winding up" provisions allowed by statute, 
due to passage of time- - -is flawed, factually and as a 
matter of law. 
In his SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K GILLETT IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS, dated 21 November 2012, Plaintiff DAVID 
K GILLETT, in his capacity as the President and chief 
executive officer of MAJESTIC AIRLINES, states: 
2. This litigation, in which MAJESTIC AIRLINES is 
a co-plaintiff, is pursuant to the winding up of 
its corporate affairs, as allowed by statute. 
Paragraph 2. RECORD at 444. This statement was not factually 
challenged by "sworn testimony" from Defendants; such a 
challenge would have constituted the "genuine dispute as to 
material fact" which would have precluded summary judgment. 
The operative statute [16-l0a-1405, Utah Code] does not 
specify a time period for "winding up". Defendants-
Appellees' arguments [p. 26] concerning the analogy to the 
expressed statutory restriction for claims AGAINST a 
dissolved corporation (of "5-7 years") are inappropriate. In 
13 
fact, that the Legislature expressed a statutory period ( "5-
7 years" in one statute [16-l0a-1407: for claims AGAINST the 
dissolved corporation] but made NO expressed period for 
claims BY the dissolved corporation actually works against 
the "by analogy" argument advanced by the Appellees. 
As such, this "appeal" has identified the erroneous 
ruling (both parts) "for appeal", if only to avoid "law of 
the case" issues if the major issues on appeal (ala "statute 
of limitation") result in a remand. For that reason, the 
District Court's "winding up" ruling should be set aside. 
The "first breach" doctrine. 
Much like the trial court 1 s gratuitous, unsolicited 
raising of the "first breach" doctrine---first raised in its 
written "memorandum decision" of June 2014 [RECORD at 946-
956; ATTACHMENT #2 to APPELLANT 1 S BRIEF, ADDENDUM C to 
APPELLEE' S REPLY BRIEF] responding to Plaintiffs' "new 
trial" (Rule 59) and "set aside" (Rule 60) motions. The 
District Court's statement [page 3 of its Ruling; RECORD at 
948] is: 
( 2) Plaintiffs' were the first party to breach 
[FOOTNOTE to "first breach" cases] the contract at 
issue in 1995 and therefore, the six (6) year 
statute of limitations expired in 2001. 
Emphasis added. Footnote referring to and describing cases 
omitted.] Such a simplistic statement (i.e. "therefore, the 
six (6) year statute .. expired in 2001"), coupled with 
the footnoted reference to the "first breach" cases, makes 
no sense and evidences a complete misapplication---if not a 
complete misunderstanding- - -of the "first breach" doctrine, 
14 
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particularly as applied to this case. Appellants essentially 
quote [page 28 of their BRIEF OF APPELLEES] this statement, 
claiming the trial court "correctly ruled" . [p. 2 8 of BRIEF 
OF APPELLEES] . Appellees' statement makes no more sense than 
the District Courts': the "statute of limitation"---
implicitly acknowledged to be "six years" for these 
"contract"-based claims---does not begin to run when the 
Plaintiff "first breached" the contract; the statute, for 
claims against the Defendants for their "breach" of the 
contract, begins to "run" when the Defendants may have 
11 breached II the contract. Under the "fraudulent concealment" 
doctrine of Russell Packard Development, the acknowledged 
six-year statute for "contract" situations would be extended 
until the "discovery" of the "breach", and that "discovery" 
did not occur until March 2002. 
The trial court's following statement adds to the 
continuing confusion of things, thus: 
(3) Although concealment is at issue, the 
concealment pertains to Defendants' alleged fraud 
inducing Plaintiffs to sign the release in 
December 1996, which Plaintiffs alleged to not 
have discovered until March 2002. 
RULING, p. 4; RECORD at 949. Emphasis added. This statement 
evidences the trial court's misunderstanding, and resultant 
misapplication, of the "statutes of limitations". The 
alleged "concealment" was of the existence of the March 1995 
BROWN "paydown payment" (of $250k, pursuant to the "personal 
guarantee" of the repayment of the MAJESTIC AIRLINES loan) ; 
that "concealment" was so pleaded. The December 1996 
15 
"Release" was signed by Plaintiffs, ignorant of the 1995 
"paydown payment" from a year earlier, pursuant to BROWN'S 
"fraudulent" inducement to do so ( ala sign) , based upon 
knowing, materially-false statements ( as to the claimed 
owing of additional monies, that GILLETT would be prosecuted 
for interstate theft) . Any "fraud" so claimed (by the 
Plaintiffs) in the context of the December 1996 "Release" 
was for the purpose of challenging the validity of the 
"Release" and its use so as to bar Plaintiffs' claims. As 
such, the factual issues inherent in Plaintiffs' "fraud in 
the inducement" for the execution of the "Release" would 
have constituted the "genuine dispute of material fact" 
which would have precluded the granting of summary judgment. 
In the end, the District Court narrowed its actual "summary 
judgment" ruling to be on the "statute of limitation" 
grounds. 
The District Court's "first breach" analysis, seemingly 
replicated and expanded in pages 27-28 of BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES, oversimplifies things, so to come to an incorrect 
conclusion. While the Appellees-quoted statements are 
generally correct, in principle, when applied to the 
complexity of this case, such statements over- simplify 
things to a fault. 
In this case, the parties---in 1994, in advance of and 
as a condition to making and receiving the sizeable 
commercial loan for almost one-half million dollars- - -
adopted extensive "loan documents" provisions, consisting of 
16 
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multiple documents of various pages of length, scope and 
detail. Repayment of the loan was secured by personal 
property worth a couple million dollars; repayment was 
"personally guaranteed" by two natural persons and one 
corporate entity (having even greater personal property 
assets, at least greater than co-guarantor GILLETT). 
Repayment was additionally secured by created "security 
interests" in the collateral, thus invoking- - -expressly 
and/ or implicitly- - -the provisions of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code [UCC], particularly Article 9 pertaining to 
Secured Transactions. 
Extensive provisions were expressly agreed upon and 
adopted concerning what would happen- - -namely, repossession 
and/or foreclosure of and against the collateral. Those 
provisions were agreed to, to be applicable in cases of 
"breach". The fact---acknowledged by Plaintiffs---that 
MAJESTIC AIRLINES was late, even "in default", in making its 
contractually-identified monthly loan repayments should not 
be, in simplistic fashion, misconstrued and/or misapplied, 
so as to excuse SENTRY (as Lender) of the contractual 
obligations SENTRY expressly agreed to follow, in case of 
such breach. 
The "first breach" doctrine should not be applied in a 
oversimplified manner, to deny remedies for violations of 
contractual promises---including the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing---the Lender agreed to carry 
out, in spite of the Borrower's, "first breach" . 
17 
As with the "winding up" issue, the trial court's 
"first breach" ruling---totally unnecessary for the 
disposi ti ve "statute of limitation" ruling actually made- - -
has been "appealed", if only to avoid future "law of the 
case" problems if the case is remanded for trial. If the 
summary judgment on the "statute of limitations" bar is 
affirmed, the "first breach" issue is irrelevant. 
IV 
APPELLANTS' APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS, 
FOR "ATTORNEY'S FEES" OR ANY OTHER PURPOSE 
Appellants dispute Defendants' claim that this "appeal" 
is frivolous; ultimately the Court of Appeals will decide 
and may expressly rule thereon. 
The "appeal" is not likely to be "dismissed" (Rule 34 
terminology, quoted on page 31), but rather will be decided 
on-the-merits. Many of Appellees' quotations and discussions 
[seep. 31 of BRIEF OF APPELLEES] pertain to situations and 
events which are inapplicable here: Plaintiffs-Appellants 
have filed the "opening brief" and every other required 
document. 
Defendants' claims---made by persons and entities who 
have candidly admitted they kept secret the $250k "paydown 
payment", which was more than half of the borrower's 
obligation at the time, from the Plaintiffs until 2002 and 
in the meantime openly misrepresented to the District Court 
(Judge Wilkinson) and the Plaintiffs the true status of the 
loan obligation---seem a little hollow, in light of their 
own "unclean hands" in things. 
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Before Defendants' claims about "frivolous" are 
resolved, the Defendants' own "unclean hands II in making the 
"non-preservation II claims addressed and successfully 
rebutted, in Point I herein, must be examined and applied, 
to the same standard and result. 
Defendants' arguments concerning "attorney's fees" are 
simply an inappropriate, "back door" way to seek and obtain 
attorney's fees when no evidence as to any justification 
(ala contract or statute) was identified, nor were such 
previously claimed nor "found" by the trial court, nor were 
such awarded by the trial court, nor were the trial court 
rulings (actually, non-rulings) on any "attorney's fees" 
issues cross-appealed by the Appellee-Defendants. 
The claim for award of costs and/or attorney's fees 
must be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant SENTRY FINANCIAL has openly admitted it 
failed to disclose- - -to the Borrower [MAJESTIC AIRLINES] and 
its personnel---the March 1995 BROWN "paydown payrnent 11 of 
almost $250,000. SENTRY persisted in that secretive behavior 
throughout 1995 ("private sale" of collateral, lawsuit 
pleadings filed, return of collateral to MAJESTIC, 
negotiations for MAJESTIC- sponsored "auction", and so forth) 
and until March 2002, when the "paydown payrnent 11 was first 
acknowledged in Mr Ruga's deposition in an another civil 
case. Not only was the 11 paydown payrnent 11 not disclosed, but 
SENTRY actively misled Plaintiffs MAJESTIC and GILLETT and 
19 
the Third District Court [Judge Wilkinson] as to the true 
nature of the MAJESTIC indebtedness. Those statements [that 
"$450,000 was owed" (paraphrased) when in fact only 
"$200,000 was actually owed"] were materially false and in 
violation of "the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing". 
The Defendants' intentional non-disclosure---
particularly in face of 1995 court filings when Rule 11 
mandated greater candor and honesty in fact---of the 
"paydown payment" extended commencement of the running of 
the statute of limitation, of 6-years for "contract" claims, 
until March 2002. The Plaintiffs' 2007 filing was within the 
six years, and the "saving statute" preserved the claim 
until the current litigation was timely filed in 2008; 
Defendant-Appellees acknowledge this. 
BROWN'S continuous absence from the state since the 
mid-1990s effectively tolls the running of any statute of 
limitation against him, in accordance with Section 78B-2-
104. This result occurs regardless of any "choice of forum" 
provisions within the ''loan documents" contracts. 
The peripheral issues- - - "first breach" doctrine and the 
"winding up" issues---are unnecessary and/or incorrectly 
applied to the "statute of limitation" issue incorrectly 
applied by the District Court. Those issues should be 
summarily overruled. 
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